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Abstract This paper surveys the issues involved in set-
ting or improving regulatory activity in the presence of un-
certainty. It is conducted in a way that will bring forth the
underlying intuitions of the existing literature so that the var-
ious policy options can easily be distinguished on grounds of
efficiency, as well as distributional and international consid-
erations. This approach not only fits well into a section out-
lining the need for regulatory review, but also provides a basis
for suggesting the issues involved in regulating fisheries. In-
tuition more than modeling aids in initially applying general
analysis to specific areas, and the fisheries example illustrates
how that application can be scientifically accomplished.
1. Introduction
An extensive literature has developed over the past decade in
which the relative merits of various types of regulatory control
mechanisms bave been investigated under uncertainty. These
studies have been fairly analytical and abstract, but they have
begun to be applied to a variety of more specific problems. En-
vironmental controls have been studied.' International trade re-
strictions bave been studied.^ Applications to tax-based incomes
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policies and legalistic fining schedules have been accomplished.^
The list is longer, to be sure, and grows with this volume to
include fisheries, as well. In contributing to this growth, though,
this paper will continue in the newer vein of the literature to
stress intuition rather than hard-core analytics. These analytics
are no longer necessary because the previous work has revealed
a robust intuitive underpinning that is more easily applied. If we
are to be able to talk to the people who do the regulating, more-
over, a thorough understanding of that intuition will be essential.
We must be able to communicate our work to regulators without
risking the glazed-eye disbelief that so often greets a technically
tight modeling of a regulatory problem.
With that objective in mind, this paper begins with a descrip-
tion of the efficient responses to uncertainty that one might ex-
pect to observe in a perfectly functioning market. These re-
sponses are subsequently employed, in section 3, to catalog
reasons why regulations might be required before we turn to
discuss alternative mechanisms in sections 4 and 5. Section 4
will discuss the single-firm situation, not because it is terribly
relevant to applied problems, but rather because the intuition is
more easily explained when there is only one firm about which
to worry. Section 5 corrects for the simplicity of the single-firm
example by including an arbitrary multiple-firm market. Section
6 looks briefly at informational concerns before my perceptions
of the fisheries problem are employed to reach policy conclu-
sions about their regulation in the concluding section. My knowl-
edge of fisheries is, at best, limited, but it is hoped that the in-
tuition outlined in the earher sections will enable the reader to
determine how correcting for my perceptual errors might alter
my conclusions.
2. Efficient Responses to Uncertainty
When they operate efficiently, costlessly, and in the absence of
any externalities, competitive markets allow unrestrained re-
actions to all relevant sources of uncertainty by every agent.
These agents respond in their own best interest, of course, but
their collective response maximizes welfare in each and everyRegulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Survey 173
state of nature. This statement is simply a generalization of the
fundamental theorem of welfare economics and is thus widely
known.'^ but it says nothing about the distribution of welfare
across agents. Formalizing the collection of individual responses
to uncertainty can, as a result, provide not only enormous insight
into the distributions of agent responses as functions of random
uncertainty, but also on potential rationale for regulatory intru-
sion into the marketplace. Postponing that for later, though, we
first turn to providing the requisite formalization.
Consider a market for some good x consisting of N individuals
indexed by theirinverse demand schedules t/'(j:,,3i);/= 1,. . . ,
A^; and M firms indexed by their cost schedules c\xj, hi);j =
\, . . . ,M. The vector p = (pj, . . . , p^) reflects random var-
iables that influence the demand schedules for x registered by
the various consumers, while the vector 8 = (6 , SA,) re-
flects similar variables that can alter the cost of producing x at
the various firms. The competitive equilibrium for an arbitrary
state of nature (p. 8) is now easily characterized. It requires
simply that the universal marginal cost of producing x equals the
price every consumer must pay and that the total quantity sup-
plied at that price equal the total quantity demanded. Notation-
ally, then, the market-clearing price /?*(p. 8) produces reaction
schedules .rf [p,-, p*(p, 8)] for individuals and A-*[5,.p*(3, 8)]
for firms that satisfy
pnp, 8) = ^'k*[p,-,p*{P, 8)], p,} = f^,{x;i5,,p*(p, 8)], 6,} (1)
for all /= 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , A/, and
n AT
E -^*[P/' P*(P. 8)] = 2 4[h> /'*(P^ 8)] (2)
i-l
Each firm, as well as the entire industry, therefore generates a
distribution of quantity produced over (p, 8) just as each con-
sumer, as well as the entire market, generates a distribution of
quantity demanded. The crux of the regulatory problem under
uncertainty will be argued to center on these distributions andGary W. Yohe
how well various regulatory mechanisms allow them to continue
even in their presence. It will pay us dividends, therefore, to
spend a few sentences seeing what equations 1 and 2 can tell us
about efficient reaction to uncertainty.
It is, more specifically, critical to notice that the reactions
captured by the .v*[—] and x*[—] do not benefit every agent in
the market; their costs and benefits are simply balanced against
each other as well as possible. To see this, consider responses
in xt[—] to random fiuctuation in p,. These responses must im-
prove consumer welfare, or they would not be undertaken; they
increase the quantity demanded at any price when the schedule
is high, and vice versa. They are not, however, beneficial to the
producer side of the market if they translate into fluctuation in
the total quantity demanded. That type of demand-inspired fiuc-
tuation increases expected production costs at each firm to the
degree that it absorbs the variation.-^ By the same token, output
fluctuations that reflect efficient reactions to cost uncertainties
in the x*[~] reduce the expected benefits derived from con-
suming ;r if they, too, translate in fluctuation in the total quantity
supplied. The theorem quoted above does not fail because of
these trade-offs, though; it states, instead, that a competitive
market balances these trade-offs as well as possible.
3. The Need for Regulation
One of the more common rationales for regulatory intervention
traces its roots to a breakdown in the competitive structure of
the market. Monopolists produce too little, for example, charge
an excessive price, and, because they operate along a negatively
sloped marginal revenue schedule that is steeper than the de-
mand (i.e., marginal-benefit) schedule, allow too little response
to cost uncertainties. Such a firm could be confronted with a
variety of controls in the output market, of course, but they are
most usually regulated through the return that they earn on their
capital.*^ While it may appear, at first, that the model just de-
scribed in section 2 would not then apply, this is not the case.
It is necessary only to translate variation in the input market into
variation in the output market to bring our model to bear. It hasRegulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Survey 175
been shown, in fact, that variation in a regulated input translates
into the maximum amount of variations in a regulated output for
the Cobb-Douglas case, and that this translation declines to zero
(some constant) as the production function displays perfect sub-
stitution (Leontief technologies).^ Even the control alternatives
have analogues. Specifying a rate of return to capital can be
viewed quite accurately as a price control on the capital market,
and thus it fits nicely into our model. A regulator could, alter-
natively, specify capital investment directly by. in a sense, na-
tionalizing the firm into a publicly owned enterprise. That is not
likely in the United States, of course, but the point is made that
regulatory options available in product markets are not neces-
sarily ruled out just because we might be talking about an input
market.
Another rationale for regulation can be drawn from the un-
certainties themselves. There may, for example, be reason to
protect some individuals from the conditions that a competitive
market would force upon them in a bad state of nature. The
example that springs to mind to illustrate this case involves the
rationing of an important commodity (like gasoline or home heat-
ing oil) in the event of a sudden shortfall in supply. The market
would respond to such a shortfall by increasing the price of the
good in question, and the resulting welfare loss would be felt
most heavily by lower-income consumers. These consumers
would, in particular, feel the effect of a relatively large income
effect, and the government might want to protect them from such
a disproportionate loss. Quantity rationing across all individuals,
with or without a white market for rationing coupons, might thus
be proposed.**
Still other situations combine the two rationales, so that both
production-level concerns and variability concerns must be
weighed. Consider, as an illustration, a standard pollution-con-
trol problem. Emissions without controls might be too high, and
some type of mechanism designed to lower emissions would then
be required. In addition, variation around a desired level of av-
erage emissions might dramatically increase their expected social
cost, if high-emissions states of nature produce widespread
health damage. An environmental regulator would, in that case.'76 Gary W. Yohe
be forced to design a control that would not only reduce total
emissions, but also lower their variability. Compounding the
problem, though, would be the efficiency gains that each emitter
would garner if his emissions could respond to demand and cost
uncertainty. A trade-off of the sort outlined above would have
to be weighed in the ultimate design even after total emissions
had been reduced.
4. Regulatory Alternatives in Single-Firm Markets'*
Consider, first of all, a single, profit-maximizing firm facing a
randomly fluctuating demand environment with a stochastic pro-
duction cost schedule. Part of management's role in running such
a firm would be to adjust its output in response to these uncer-
tainties. Properly administered, these adjustments would im-
prove the firm's profitability and make it a more attractive prop-
erty. If the firm's private production costs did not cover the
social costs of its output, though, the firm would nonetheless
always produce socially excessive output levels. Some type of
regulation would be required, therefore, to correct for these ex-
cesses, but regulation designed to lower output would neces-
sarily have some effect on management's ability to react to un-
certainty. The classic trade-off between social need and private
profitability would thus come squarely into play. As reported in
the introduction, a widening literature has explored the com-
parative advantages and weaknesses of a variety of regulatory
mechanisms within that trade-off. Providing the intuition behind
that literature is the goal of this section.
The simplest way to develop that intuition is to consider the
two single-valued alternative control mechanisms first. A control
authority could, for example, issue an output order for the firm
specifying precisely how much it must produce regardless ofthe
state of nature. Since such an order would usually be issued well
before actual cost and demand conditions were known, its spec-
ification would have to be based on the regulator's expectations
of what should happen. The control agency could, in particular,
do no better than prescribe an output target that would maximize
ex ante expected welfare (expected benefits minus expected so-Regulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Survey 177
cial cost). The target could therefore be wrong. It would equate
expected marginal costs and benefits, to be sure, but imposing
it would allow no flexibility in response to the ultimate economic
environment. If, for example, costs were lower than anticipated
or demand were higher, then the firm would strain against an
output constraint; it would be forced to limit its output to the
prescribed target even though ex post welfare would be im-
proved if it were allowed to produce more. It is precisely this
lack of flexibility that has led many economists to shun produc-
tion quotas as an acceptable means of regulation. This wide-
spread disdain will turn out to be ill-founded, of course, but their
reasoning does isolate the source of the problems that selling-
quantity restrictions might involve.
On the other extreme one finds a single-valued price control
that is frequently accused of allowing too much flexibility. An
optimal price could, of course, be approximated by computing
the level of expected marginal production cost (or net social ben-
efit) of the optimal quota, but the possible errors in that com-
putation are not the critical concem. Far more to the point is
the variability in output that prescribing a single price would
allow. While that variability would make the firm more profitable
than it would be under the quota (otherwise, it would not be
forthcoming), it could easily lower total expected welfare. Out-
put variation based on cost fluctuation would, in particular, both
increase the expected social cost of that production and decrease
the expected benefits that it would generate."* If these fluctua-
tion effects were large enough, they could easily dominate the
profitability improvement felt by the firm and could lower the
level of welfare.
The best sliding control can now be viewed as an economic
and political compromise between these two extremes. Suppose
that the control authority were to issue a price schedule that
corresponded precisely to its view of expected net marginal so-
cial benefits." The profit-maximizing firm would then respond
by producing an output characterized by the equality of actual
marginal cost and expected net benefit. Since net social benefits
refiect the extra social costs of production as well as the benefits
of consumption, such a schedule would best represent what aGary W. Yohe
control agency could do in the face of uncertainty; it would allow
the appropriate amount of output response to cost variability for
the expected conditions of the benefit side.
To see the source of this superiority more clearly, consider
Figure 1. On that graph, p represents the best price control; x,
the best quota; Emc, the expected marginal cost of production;
and Emsbi and Emsb2, two different schedules of expected net
social benefits. Note that these last schedules are drawn to in-
tersect Emc at (i, p); their only difference lies in their slopes,
but that difference reflects a critical contrast between the benefit
side conditions that they represent. Schedule Emsb. is, in par-
ticular, steeper so that it incorporates a steep demand schedule
for product x, a steep marginal social cost schedule for .v, or
both. The former means that cost-induced output variation could
dramatically lower the expected benefits of consumption from
the level achieved by x, and the latter means that such variation
would similarly increase the expected social cost of production.
In either case, an optimal sliding control would seriously dampen
the amount of output variation allowed even though it might help
the firm to become more profitable. Figure 1 shows that issuing
a sliding schedule that duplicates the Emsb, would do just that.
For a low-cost state of nature like the one drawn there, for ex-
ample, i would still be produced under the quota, but i > > i
would be produced under p. A sliding schedule corresponding
to Emsbi would elicit xt, meanwhile, and the expense of the
variations allowed by p might thereby be reduced. For the steep
schedule Emsb2, though,xt <<x would be produced. Precisely
when output variation would be expensive, therefore, a sliding
price set to mimic expected set marginal social benefits would
dampen that variation.
5. Regulatory Mechanisms in Multiple-Firm Markets
With this intuition in mind, it is now time to introduce a serious
caveat. Economists who have attempted to apply the control
mechanisms that optimally regulate a single firm to situations
involving more than one firm have frequently run into trouble.
Their problem has been to devise a way of dividing the scheduleRegulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Survey 179
Emc
FIGURE 1. Comparison of control mechanisms.
that best regulates their collection of offending firms into its op-
timal component parts—the schedules that best regulate the in-
dividual firms that constitute their collection. Compounding the
problem, there are frequently physical and legal barriers that
make it next to impossible for one firm in the collection to know
very much about what is happening elsewhere. Any proposed
control mechanism must, nonetheless, be applicable to the mul-
tiple-firm case if it is to be considered seriously. It is thus for-
tunate that the intuitive groundwork for extending the schedule
developed in the previous section to situations involving more
than one regulatee has already been completed.ISO Gary W. Yohe
Earlier studies of direct control mechanisms have reported
that the covariances across the output distribution can be crit-
ically important when many firms are to be regulated.'" Because
these covariances will play a similar role here, care must be taken
at this juncture to explain the intuition behind this observation.
Even without a formal proof, however, the explanation is not
difficult. It has already been argued that efficient reaction to cost
uncertainty by a firm, for example, should be encouraged only
up to a point; the resulting variation in output could dramatically
reduce the expected benefits generated on the demand side if it
were allowed to go unchecked. The greater the output variation,
the greater the reduction. When many firms are involved,
though, expected benefits depend upon the variation in total out-
put, and not necessarily upon the variation in the output of any
particular firm. The variance in total output is therefore crucial
in the multifirm case, and it is in the computation of that variance
that the covariance can assume enormous importance.
To see why, it is necessary to consider only two cases. In the
first, suppose that the cost uncertainties facing the firms to be
regulated were, on the average, negatively correlated. The de-
sired outputs of the firms would then tend to move in the opposite
direction so that where some firms were increasing their pro-
duction levels, other firms would be lowering theirs. Individual
output variation would therefore cancel, to some degree, and
more flexibility could be allowed at the firm level for any given
variation in total output. If, on the other hand, the cost uncer-
tainties were positively correlated, individual production levels
would tend to move in the same direction and the opposite con-
clusion would be drawn; less flexibility could be allowed at the
firm level for a given variance in their total output. A more pre-
cise demonstration can be provided, but this intuitive description
of the role of correlations across firms is sufficient to trace the
impact on the shape of the best fiexible control.
It is possible, in particular, to argue that the adjustments just
prescribed can be accomplished by simply changing the slope of
the optimal sliding control schedule in a straightforward way.
Recall Figure 1. It was observed there that steeper control sched-
ules dampen the output response of any firm to random costRegulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Survey 181
fiuctuation; flatter schedules conversely encourage larger output
responses to the same fiuctuation. If the positive correlations
mandate smaller responses at the individual firms, therefore, one
need only make the sliding control schedule facing the firm a
little steeper. The appropriate adjustment in output variation
would automatically follow. Negative correlations have been
shown to afford the opportunity for large responses, on the other
hand, and fiatter schedules would be appropriate. The size of
these adjustments would, of course, depend not only on the
strength of the correlations, but also on demand cost parameters;
the direction, however, has been shown dependent only on the
sign ofthe correlations.
If it now strikes the reader that it would be enormously difficult
to compute sliding schedules that would incorporate all of these
correlation effects as well as the price elasticity of demand, 1
must admit that I agree. It would, in most cases, border on the
impossible. There is, however, one alternative that simplifies the
computation while, at the same time, allowing the maximum
amount of intrafirm flexibility subject to a constant level of total
output. This alternative is a market solution, but only in an ar-
tificial sense. If, in particular, transferable production licenses
were issued in a quantity that matched the desired total output
ofthe industry, then that quantity would be produced with max-
imum efficiency. Firms confronting a bad state of nature would
respond to an excess in licenses by selling their surplus to firms
wishing to exceed their allotment. The result would be an equal-
ization of net marginal production costs across all firms even as
the prescribed level of total output appeared in the market.'^
Welfare losses would accrue only on the demand side as the
optimal quantity demanded fluctuated, and therein would lie the
trade-ofr. In cases in which variation in total output would be
harmful, then, this type of "white market" in licenses should be
strongly considered.
6. Informational Requirements
Quantity standards are frequently rejected out of hand because,
to be set properly, they would require that the regulatory agency182 Gary W. Yohe
digest marginal cost data from every single firm. It is clear from
equation 1, however, that computing the appropriate price al-
ternative would require the same information. The "white mar-
ket" solution suggested in section 5 avoids that problem, though,
because the efficient distribution of output across firms would
be forthcoming regardless of how the licenses were initially al-
located.^"^ This is a strong statement, but it speaks to the power
of markets—the power of the license market, in this case. More-
over, the market-clearing price for licenses reveals an enormous
amount of information. It can be argued, in fact, that the price
a production license would bear would reflect the price control
defined in equation 1. If one were interested in setting a price
control on output, therefore, one could choose to run a license
market for a short period of time in lieu of computing the plethora
of marginal cost schedules that equation I prescribes.
To see why all of these points are valid, it is simpler to put
uncertainty concerns aside for the moment and consider a model
of how one might attempt to manage a supply shortfall. Let djip)
represent the demand for good x registered at any price p by the
jth agent (7 = 1, . . . , n). Since an agent can be either a private
consumer or an industrial producer, dj{p) can refiect either an
individual's consumptive demand for a product on a firm's de-
rived demand for a factor.'*^ Suppose now that a total demand
could be restricted to some ^ by a set of taxes that could be
different for each agent. The best set of these taxes, {t*dj}j=i,
minimizes the deadweight loss; that is, under the appropriate
conditions on the marginal utility of income, the {/*a[,}"=i min-
imize
2 r " djis) ds - tjdjipo + tj) (3)
with respect to each tj subject to
n
2 djipo + tj) ^ X
In equation 3, po is the initial price that clears the market beforeRegulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Survey 183
the shortfall. Setting up the appropriate Lagrangian, the first-
order conditions that
djiPo + //) - djip,. + tf) - t* d'lip,, + tj)
t* + Kdjip^ + tj) = 0, J = { ,/7
dictate that
t* = k^ t*, J = \, . . . , n (4)
The price increase faced by each individual must refiect precisely
the social shadow price of the rationing constraint so that all of
the optimal individual tax rates are equal.
There are a number of reasons why this tax mechanism might
not be employed, especially for a short-term shortage. First of
all, there are what might be termed equity concerns. The tax
would amount to a sudden increase in the price of A: which would,
to some extent, be unanticipated. A large number of intertem-
poral and locational (long-term) decisions may have been made
on the expectation of a stable (relative) price for jr. If the shortfall
is to be of limited duration, distortions in those decisions should
be avoided. Even if the shortfall is permanent, a policy that in-
creased the price more gradually over a longer period of time
would be preferable. Finally, there is an informational concern.
Correctly computing the social shadow price of x requires de-
mand information from every agent that purchases jr. Collecting
and digesting that information would be extraordinarily expen-
sive.
The equity concern could be alleviated by adopting an equiv-
alent set of quotas:"'
{x* = djip,, + /*)} y (5)
For a short-term shortage, coupons entitling the holder to one
unit of X could be given away in accordance with equation 5.
For the duration of the shortfall, the purchase of x could thenGary W. Yohe
require both the payment of p^ in cash and the forfeiture of one
coupon. For a long-term shortage whose sudden appearance is
unsettling, the same allocation of coupons could be sold at a
price that gradually increased from zero to /* at whatever rate
seems appropriate. The same informational problems arise here,
though, since equation 5 also requires demand parameters from
each agent. In addition, an allocation mechanism that quickly
delivers exactly x* to agent 7 would be an administrative task of
incredible difficulty. The cost of collecting, digesting, and acting
upon the demand information necessary to construct either the
optimal tax or its equivalent quotas therefore seems to preclude
the imposition of either.
Alternatives abound, though. A variety of arbitrary coupon
allocations can be proposed that might be less involved. Each
agent could, for example, be sold coupons at p,, up to an amount
that will reduce his demand by the same proportion (or absolute
amount) as everyone else. Both of these schemes have an air of
equity, but they both require that the rationing authority know
how much each agent ordinarily demanded at p,,—another in-
formational nightmare. Suppose, instead, that the available sup-
plies were shared equally among the agents. Only supply infor-
mation would be required, in that case, but serious distributional
effects might then be felt. Agents whose initial demands were
high would bear more of the burden than someone who actually
used less than his share before the shortage, for example. An
intermediate policy that could strike a compromise between
these extreme administrative and allocative difficulties would be
best.
Fortunately, there is a way of making that compromise. Sup-
pose that each agent were sold a fixed number of coupons (xj)
at p«, where Xj emerges from some arbitrary mechanism and
2 Xj = X (6)
Each coupon would entitle the bearer to one unit of jc, so equa-Regulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Survey 185
tion 6 is the supply constraint. It can be argued that from
{xj}j^ I, a final distribution of goods that reproduces {xf}"^ j can
be achieved, at least in approximation, by simply allowing the
purchase and sale of the coupons at whatever price the market
will bear. It will also be shown that the equilibrium price for
coupons will be {po + t*). Despite these results, though, there
is a distributional cost caused by a transfer to consumer surplus
from the buyers of coupons to the sellers. This loss is smaller
the closer {!/}/'= i is to {xf}j=i, but it is always smaller than the
loss that would be felt under either a laissez-faire policy on a tax
of t*\ both would allow suppliers to charge p,, + t* for each
unit, not just for those units for which coupons changed hands.
If the shortage were permanent, furthermore, the coupon price
could be slowly raised in an anticipated pattern that would allow
consumers some time to prepare for the higher price while al-
ways restricting total consumption to x. Unless it is very ex-
pensive for the rationing agency to come reasonably close to
{xj}j^i, therefore, a "white market" mechanism seems ex-
tremely worthwhile.
It remains only to support these claims by analyzing the re-
sidual market in coupons that would emerge after an arbitrary
rationing allocation. For simplicity, assume that each agent's
demand forx is linear in /?; that is, represent the demand schedule
for agenty by'''
p = aj - bjXj, j = \, . . . ,n
Let xj represent preshortage consumption by agent J at po and
Xj represent the number of coupons agenty buys (Xj > 0) or sells
(Xy < 0). For a rationing allotment designated Xj,
p = Pa -\- bjXj - bjXj
= Po + bjXj - bjXj - bjXj
because xj = xj + Xj- As a result, the excess demand for coupons
by agent y isGary W. Yohe
In equilibrium, total excess demand for coupons must be zero,
so from equation 7
(Po - P') 2 iVbj) + {x -x) = 0
where i = 2^"=i Xj. Clearly, then, the price of coupons exceeds
and
XJ = (xj - Xj) - (i - xV bj 2 {Mb,) (9)
is the equilibrium transaction made by agent j. Under the white
market, the rationing causes agent j to adjust total consumption
by
It is important to note that equation 9 is independent of the initial
rationing {x,}J=,; only the total shortfall {i - x) appears in this
summary of the overall change in the coupon price. Finally, it
will be useful to observe from equation 10
. — , ' t w J — I, . . . , n (II)
V LkA.if Oj
and
2 {LxjY = X -X
J=iRegulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Survey 187
These equations can be viewed as a linear system in {Axj}j=i
whose solution defines the consumption equilibrium for
VVry= I-
The best allocation {.r/};'=i meanwhile minimizes the sum of
the deadweight losses felt by every agent. In terms of the




^ XJ = X
The appropriate first-order conditions,
-bjixj - xj) = -\, y = 1, . . . , «
can be written
T;, i^j ^ \ n (12)
where (AJC,)* = iy - x*. Since
(,r = X -X
as well, it must be true (looking at equations 11 and 12) that
Jr, f = 1, . . . ,/i
The equivalent /* can also be computed. Market demand for x
can be derived from horizontal addition of individual demand1S8 Gary W. Yohe
schedules, so
j=i i-i j-i
When total consumption falls from x to x, then




Comparing /* with (/?' - /?„) on equation 8, it is clear that the
residual coupon market for any rationing allocation achieves the
best distribution of ;c at a market-clearing price precisely equal
to the coupon allocation price plus the equivalent tax.
My claims have thus been verified in the simplest of models.
They do extend, however. They are true for every state of nature
when demand is uncertain. The analysis easily applies to supply-
side regulation, so that the full generality of equation 1 can be
achieved. And the results hold in close approximation when de-
mand is not linear. Finally, it should be observed that the power
of the license market depends in no way upon optimality prop-
erties, either the chosen aggregate constraint x or the initial al-
location J/. These allocations could be arbitrarily set and their
total could be biologically determined, for example, and still the
market would function to produce the optimal distribution.
7. Concluding Remarks: An Application to Fisheries
Though certainly naive, my perception ofthe fisheries problem
is framed by two conjectures:
1. There exists a need to allow the maximum flexibility in the
quantity offish caught by each fishermen.Regulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Stdrvey 189
2. But, at the same time, there exists a need to strictly regulate
the total number of fish caught during any one particular
season.
The rough parallels between the fisheries problem and a pollution
control problem are, at least to me, therefore quite striking.
While flexibility is desirable, wide swings in total production
could be extremely harmful to the efforts to maintain a steady-
state stock of fish and extremely expensive in terms of fishing
activity in bad states of nature. It would seem, therefore, that
the existing literature should apply.
In light of that Hterature, in fact, it should be no surprise that
my naive perception would lead me to strongly urge the insti-
tution of a program of transferable, quantity-specific licenses.
Total output could thus be closely regulated in an environment
that would allow fishermen as much fiexibility as possible. At
the same time, administrative costs could be held to a minimum
because regulators could rest assured that if their initial allot-
ments were incorrect, the license market would automatically
correct their errors. Finally, a license market would guarantee
that even a fisherman whose luck had deserted him during one
or two periods could generate at least some income by selling
some of the allotment he was granted for those periods to others.
Solvency worries might thereby be reduced.
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7. See Yohe (1977a; 1979a).
8. See Yohe (1979b) and references.
9. The single-firm examples that appear in this section operate under
the assumption that the firm is not exercising its monopoly power. The
various control options are presented in the context of a socially minded
firm that acts as if it were a competitive market so that the options
may be initially studied without the complications that many firms cre-
ate. Multifirm examples will subsequently be examined in section 5.
It should also be noted that the stochastic demand schedule developed
here can, under appropriate assumptions about the marginal utility of
income, be considered to represent marginal benefits. These widely
known assumptions are made implicitly throughout the paper.
10. Without an associated efficiency, output variation decreases ex-
pected benefits to a degree dictated by the curvature of the benefit
schedule. The more the benefit schedule is curved (i.e., the steeper
the marginal benefit schedule), the more expected benefits fall for a
given amount of output variation. Expected social costs are similarly
affected.
11. Expected net social benefits indicate simply the difference be-
tween the benefits derived from the consumption and the external so-
cial costs of production.
12. See Karp and Yohe (1979) and Yohe (1977b; 1979a).
13. See Yohe (1979b).
14. See Yohe (1979b).
15. Each schedule is assumed dependent upon only the price of .r
for simplicity. Several of the results that will emerge are also true
without this assumption, but making it is probably not too severe an
approximation of the partial equilibrium type of information with which
regulatory authorities are equipped. I should also note that the price
control alternative will be computed as a tax to be added to the pre-
control price to facilitate comparisons with the price of a license in a
coupon market.
16. Here, and throughout, equivalence between two policies implies
only that the same quantity is consumed under both by every agent.
A tax and a set of quotas are not equivalent in terms of welfare unless
the tickets are auctioned by the ration authority. Their price would be
t* in equilibrium. There will be circumstances where it will be good to
move that price around, though, so equivalence will only concern quan-
tity.Regulation Under Uncertainty: An Intuitive Survey I9i
17. A few remarks on the generality of this argument when demand
is not linear are contained in a concluding paragraph of this section.
18. A more rigorous proof can be easily constructed. From equations
12, 4, and 3
(xj - X*) = \lbj = t*/bj= ix - x)/bj
From equation 9, therefore,
X. = 0
k-i
if and only if J, = xj.
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